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COMMENTS
Immunity Under the California Child Abuse and
Neglect Reporting Act: Is Absolute Immunity the
Answer?
INTRODUCTION
Violence has become an integral part of life for a large percent-
age of the families throughout the world. It erodes the very
foundations upon which they are built and creeps into the next
generation, unnoticed until its effects have undermined these
young families as well.'
This statement refers to the widespread abuse of children. In
the United States, a minimum of 4,000 children die each year
from physical abuse.2 Of the patients under five years of age seen
by emergency room physicians, approximately ten percent are
treated for inflicted trauma injuries.' In addition to traumatic in-
juries due to beating, shaking, pinching and biting, child abuse is
frequently the cause of burns. Of the children hospitalized for any
type of burn injury, studies have shown that four to nine percent
are victims of abuse,4 as are twenty-eight percent of children hos-
pitalized for tap-water burns.5
In the 1960s, awareness of the causes, proportion and effects of
child abuse increased.' Major reforms in the child protection sys-
tem ensued, including nationwide enactment of child abuse report-
ing statutes.7 These laws were enacted primarily to protect chil-
dren and help families.8 If the abuse is not reported, the child and
family will not be helped; the child could die or suffer permanent
physical and/or mental impairment.
1. THE BATTERED CHILD 2 (R. Heifer & R. Kempe, eds., 4th ed. 1987).
2. Schmitt, The Child with Nonaccidental Trauma, in THE BATTERED CHILD, supra
note 1, at 178.
3. Id.
4. Feldman, Child Abuse by Burning, in THE BATTERED CHILD, supra note 1, at
197.
5. Id.
6. Meriwether, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: Time for a Change, 20 FAtL. L. Q. 141,
142 (1986) [hereinafter Meriwether].
7. Every state currently has a child abuse statute. Meriwether, supra note 6.
8. Id.
1
Dowding: Immunity Under the California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting A
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1989
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Statutes typically contain definitions of abuse,9 mandate report-
ing of suspected cases of abuse by professionals,10 provide liability
for failure to report, abrogate certain legally recognized privi-
leges1" and provide immunity from liability for reports made by
mandated reporters.' 2 The immunity provided may be either qual-
ified" or absolute. 14
Two California courts have interpreted the California Child
Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act as providing an absolute immu-
nity from criminal or civil liability for reports made pursuant to
the Act.15 Absolute immunity precludes a successful suit against a
reporter for negligent or knowingly false reporting under the Act.
This Comment focuses on the rationale for requiring profession-
als to report suspected cases of abuse. In addition, reasons for in-
cluding some type of immunity provision for professionals are in-
cluded. The Comment explores the history of California's
immunity provision and the appellate courts' interpretations of the
provision. Finally, this Comment suggests a possible solution to
the problem of the parent's lack of a remedy for a false report.
I. THE PROBLEM
Teachers, physicians, psychotherapists, social workers and other
professionals see children every day in the course of their profes-
sional duties. Many of them work with children because they care
and want to help. Most medical personnel are required to take an
oath to help patients in any circumstances. Unfortunately, some of
these professionals are not as honest and caring as the public
expects.
For example, one case involved a twelve-year-old comatose child
9. For example: "As used in this article, 'child abuse' means a physical injury
which is inflicted by other than accidental means on a child by another person. "Child
abuse" also means the sexual assault of a child or any act or omission proscribed by Sec-
tion 273a of the California Penal Code (willful cruelty or unjustifiable punishment of a
child) or 273d (corporal punishment or injury). 'Child abuse' also means the neglect of a
child or abuse in out-of-home care, as defined in this article. Child abuse does not mean a
mutual affray between minors." CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.6 (Deering 1985).
10. The California statute currently covers teachers, teachers' aides, foster parents,
many types of health care practitioners (including physicians, psychologists, chiropractors,
dentists, and others licensed under Division 2 of the Business and Professions Code), and
commercial film and photographic print processors. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7-
11165.10 (Deering 1985).
11. Like the California statute, most states abrogate the physician-patient and psy-
chotherapist-patient privileges. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11171(b) (Deering Supp. 1988).
12. Meriwether, supra note 6, at 143.
13. A privilege is "qualified" when it does not cover all situations; it is not
"absolute."
14. A privilege is "absolute" if it covers all situations.
15. Storch v. Silverman, 186 Cal. App. 3d 679, 231 Cal. Rptr. 27 (2d Dist. 1986);
Krikorian v. Barry, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1211, 242 Cal. Rptr. 312 (2d Dist. 1987).
[Vol. 26
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who was sexually abused in her hospital room by someone using a
sharp object. The authorities arrested the nurse's aide who was on
duty at the time of the incident and charged him with child
abuse.16 Similarly, news reports reveal that day care centers for
preschool children are being investigated for alleged sexual abuse
of the children. 1  Under California's Child Abuse and Neglect
Reporting Act, both health care practitioners and child care cus-
todians are required by law to report suspected instances of child
abuse.' 8 But what if the professionals are the ones doing the abus-
ing? "'9 The Act does not speak to such circumstances.
In the situation of a day care center,20 the abusers would be
unlikely to report themselves, as child abuse is a criminal offense.
But perhaps a manager of the day care center discovers the abuse.
The manager might be afraid of potential liability. The manager
could report a suspicion that the child has been abused by some-
one else, such as the child's parent, guardian or sibling.2' Physical
evidence of the abuse may not indicate the identity of the
abuser.22 The child may be threatened not to reveal the actual
perpetrator. The child may be too young to understand the situa-
tion. An investigation into the child's family may exonerate the
parent,23 or reveal nothing.
Once a parent is charged with child abuse, based on the ac-
cuser's report and a further investigation, several things may hap-
pen. Parents may be subjected to adverse publicity, emotional up-
heaval, the potential loss of custody of their child, and great
expense in defending themselves. Before the trial, a judge could
decide there is not enough evidence to convict. At trial, the jury
could decide the parent is innocent, and the parent is acquitted.
What rights, if any, does the parent have against the day care
manager who submitted a false report, knowing it was false?
The parent has no remedy under the California Child Abuse
and Neglect Reporting Act. The immunity provision, as inter-
preted by the second district court, provides absolute immunity
16. San Diego Union, Jan. 6, 1989, BI.
17. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 17, 1986, § 1, p. 1, col. 5.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (Deering Supp. 1988).
19. See infra notes 27 and 29 for situations of possible abuse by professionals.
20. Workers in a day care center would be in the category of "child care custodi-
ans"; they would therefore be required to report under CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.7 (Deer-
ing 1985).
21. Conceivably, any number of family members could be accused in a given situa-
tion. To avoid confusion, the term "parent" will be used in this article to include any
family member accused of abuse, since parents are most often accused.
22. In some situations of sexual abuse, traces of blood or semen are used to identify
the perpetrator.
23. By studying the family and home environment of the child, the investigating
agency may decide the abuse was not performed by a member of the family.
1990]
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from liability for any reports of child abuse made pursuant to the
statute. 4 The third district has held the Act provides no immunity
for activities relating to the report, and absolute immunity for the
report and for injuries flowing from the report.25
Day care employees are not the only reporters who might file
false reports. Several cases in San Diego County have been filed
against physicians who reported child abuse.26 The plaintiffs in
these cases are alleging that the physicians' reports are either neg-
ligent, malicious or knowingly false. One would think a thorough
investigation by the authorities would not result in criminal
charges against the parent for abuse if the parent were indeed
innocent.28 However, a physician's reassurances to investigating
authorities that he or she has sufficient evidence to prove guilt
could in themselves lead to prosecution.29
The problem created under an absolute immunity interpretation
of the Act is that the innocent parent cannot successfully sue the
physician/reporter. Even if a reporter submits a knowingly false
or malicious report, or is in fact the party guilty of child abuse, he
24. Storch v. Silverman, 186 Cal. App. 3d 679, 231 Cal. Rptr. 27 (2d Dist. 1986);
Krikorian v. Barry. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1211, 242 Cal. Rptr. 312 (2d Dist. 1987).
25. Loeblich v. City of Davis, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 262 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1989).
26, Phinney v. County of San Diego, et. al., No. N30481, Affidavit in support of
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pp. 17-20 (filed April
25, 1988). Phinney cites 3 other cases, all against the hospital and a group of its employees
who are the defendants in the Phinney case.
27. Id. In Phinney, the plaintiff, mother of a two-year-old boy, alleged that the
child's physician had reported her as a child abuser to cover his own medical malpractice.
The boy fell in a bathtub; the mother brought him to the hospital, and the doctor examined
the child. The child died, apparently from a head injury. The mother was charged with
criminal abuse in the death of her son, but was exonerated of all charges. The mother
alleges the head injury was caused by the doctor's negligent treatment of the child. Since
the child died from a head injury not caused by the mother's abuse or (allegedly) by the
fall in the bathtub, the plaintiff claimed the doctor injured the child while performing tests
on him. Since the doctor reported child abuse, the lower court held that he was absolutely
immune from civil and criminal liability for making the report. Even if the doctor's act of
malpractice or abuse underlying the report were the real cause of the child's death, the
trial court felt that absolute immunity was required by the holdings in Storch v. Silverman,
186 Cal. App. 3d 679, 231 Cal. Rptr. 27 (2d Dist. 1986) and Krikorian v. Barry, 196 Cal.
App. 3d 1211, 242 Cal. Rptr. 312 (2d Dist. 1987). The case was dismissed on a summary
judgment motion by the defense. Id. at 1-21.
28. Indeed, the judge who heard the criminal case against Ms. Phinney felt that she
was a victim "of too many people who wanted, frankly, to cover their own hides." The
judge felt that, even though child abuse is a serious problem, it is "no excuse for people not
exercising their discretion in a more appropriate way. . . . I find it disgraceful that a wo-
man has to be subjected to a case like this because of speculation on the part of too many
people . . . who are looking after their own jobs and their own economic interests. I think
this is a case which cries out for a civil action and for one, I hope you bring one." Id. at 5.
29, "Whether a report is unfounded or unsubstantiated depends on the quality of
investigation. If a physician writes on the final line of his report that he is willing to go to
court and testify that a case has 'clear and convincing evidence' that it is a case of neglect
and/or abuse, it is more likely that the case would be opened." tenBensel, Reporting Child
Abuse, 35 Juv. & FAMt. COURT J. 41, 42 (1984).
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or she is protected from liability for that report.30
A. The Rationale for Mandatory Reporting
The child abuse reporting requirement is intended to protect the
abused child by bringing the abuse to the attention of social and
protective service agencies.31 These agencies can then treat the
child and the family to prevent further harm.32 Since the home is
a private place, these agencies do not normally have access to
what goes on within it. Child abuse that is likely to cause great
bodily harm is a felony;33 parents who abuse their children are
unlikely to seek help openly, for fear of criminal prosecution.
The opportunity to ferret out instances of abuse falls on those
outside the home who are likely to come in contact with the
abused child. Teachers, medical personnel, social workers and
counselors have the opportunity to observe children and their par-
ents. Medical personnel frequently see injured children, and they
are presumed most qualified to diagnose34 symptoms35 of abuse
30. Another possible scenario is one that occurred in Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychi-
atric Medical Clinic, 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P. 2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989). In that
case, a child was being treated by a psychotherapist for emotional problems. The child's
mother later discovered that the therapist had been sexually abusing the child. The mother
sued under a theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress and won. One must wonder,
however, if the psychotherapist would have been immune from liability had he only made
an official report stating that someone else was abusing the child, the situation that alleg-
edly occurred in Phinney.
A New Jersey court held that a mother, who had reported child abuse under the New
Jersey equivalent to the California Act, was not immune from liability; she, herself, was
the perpetrator of the abuse. State v. Hill, 232 N.J.Super. 353, 556 A.2d 1325 (1989).
Under this case, the doctor in Phinney would not be immune for his report. See infra notes
26-28.
31. Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 8 FAr . L. Q. 245,
310 (1974).
32. The child may be removed either temporarily or permanently from the home to
prevent further abuse. The parents may receive psychiatric counseling as a condition to
keeping or seeing the child. See generally Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Glance at the
Present, a Glimpse at the Future: A Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse
Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 641 (1978).
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(l) (Deering Supp. 1989). "Any person who, under
circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes
or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suf-
fering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or
health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in
such situation that . . . its person or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment
in the county jail. ... Subsection (2) provides that harm under conditions unlikely to
produce great bodily harm or death is a misdemeanor.
34. Although child abuse is not a disease, the terms "diagnose" and "symptom" are
used throughout the literature to refer to the detection and the signs of abuse.
35. Some symptoms of abuse are: repeated injuries; injuries that are inconsistent
with the parents' explanation of the injury as an ..cident; delay of the parents in seeking
medical care for the child; bruises leaving definite hand or finger imprints. A trained physi-
cian can distinguish bruising of this kind from accidental bruising. For further information,
5
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and neglect .3  As a result, many early reporting statutes singled
out physicians over other professionals, and required only physi-
cians to report.3 7
Physicians and other professionals may not want to report child
abuse.38 They are often reluctant to report when they can be com-
pelled to testify in court.3 Time spent in court and away from
patients could have an adverse economic impact on reporters.4 0
Reporters also fear liability for their reports. The strongest fear
in the early days of mandatory reporting was liability for breach
of the physician-patient confidential relationship.4 In response to
this fear, most states abrogate the physician-patient privilege for
reports. 2 Professionals also fear the alleged abusers will sue,
should the report prove unfounded,4 3 under causes of action in-
cluding defamation, false light invasion of privacy, malicious pros-
ecution, medical malpractice, and intentional or negligent inflic-
see Schmitt, supra note 2.
36. Besharov, Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 VILL L. REv. 458, 467 (1978).
37. Foster & Freed, Battered Child Legislation and Professional Immunity, 52
A.B.A. J. 1071 (1966); Fraser, supra note 32, at 656; Besharov, supra note 36, at 467.
38. Besharov, supra note 36, at 465, cites George Wyman's (then Commissioner of
the New York State Department of Social Services) explanation of the reasons for under-
reporting in New York. Besharov states these reasons are applicable to all states:
Although many persons will casually accept the possibility that some children
may be subjected to abuse, it appears that only the tragedy of death or severe
maiming of a child in one's own community with its ensuing publicity and notori-
ety provides the stimulus for reporting the suspected abuse of other children.
Other factors would seem to be: . . . the tendency to report abuse only when
injury is severe; diagnostic capabilities not sufficiently well-developed, particularly
in areas where medical centers are not involved; reluctance to become involved due
to fear of criminal prosecution of parents or automatic removal of children, more
personal relationship with one's neighbors in rural communities mitigates against
being willing to speak out even though this will protect a child; frustration that
reports have not in fact resulted in the desired goals, i.e., rehabilitation treatment
for the child and family, or successful adjudication in Family Court; lack of or-
ganized, vigorous program of casefinding and interpretation.
39. Study, The Iowa Child Abuse Reporting Statute: One State's Success, 65 IOWA
L. REv. 1273, 1336 (1980).
40. Id.
41. McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family, 50 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 38 (1965). McCoid, writing in 1965, before reporting statutes had been used for
long, recognized the fear, but claimed it was exaggerated: "Yet every American case in
which a physician has made disclosures concerning patients for the protection of third par-
ties has resulted in recognition of a privilege on the part of the physician and a denial of
liability. There seems little doubt that where the physician or hospital makes disclosures
which are beneficial to the child patient or which may prevent future abuse of this child or
others, the courts will recognize at least a qualified privilege which can be overcome only
by a showing of malice or lack of good faith in the facts reported." (citations omitted.) See
also, Sussman, supra note 31, at 293; Besharov, supra note 36, at 477-78; Paulsen, Child
Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 33 (1967).
42. Meriwether, supra note 6, at 147.
43. Fraser, supra note 32, at 663.
6
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tion of emotional distress.4 These fears led to the widespread
adoption of provisions granting immunity from liability for re-
quired reports made in good faith."5 A more detailed discussion of
immunity provisions follows in section C.
Provisions for immunity and abrogation of privileged communi-
cations were added in most states.4 Also included in reporting
acts are provisions for civil and/or criminal liability for failure to
report.17 These provisions apply only to mandated reports, and are
designed to encourage reporting and to provide a means of en-
forcement.48 If the law provides no means of enforcement, the
concept of mandatory reporting has little "encouragement"
value.49
In summary, mandatory reporting laws both require and en-
courage reporting of abuse cases. It is interesting to note that Cal-
ifornia's early Reporting Act called for discretion on the part of
the reporting physician." As amended in 1967,'51 the discretion
was deleted in an attempt to strengthen the mandatory character
of the statute.5 1
B. Types of Immunity
As discussed above, immunity provisions were designed to en-
courage mandated reporters, and to allay their fears of liability
should they be mistaken. To better understand the need for these
provisions, this Comment explores the legal claims and probable
results under each of three situations: (1) if no immunity were
provided by statute; (2) if a qualified immunity were provided;
and (3) if absolute immunity were provided.
Without statutory immunity, several causes of action could be
brought against medical and professional reporters. Parents could
bring an action based on malicious prosecution. Intentional inflic-
44. Sussman, supra note 31, at 293. In Storch v. Silverman, 186 Cal. App. 3d 673 at
674, 231 Cal. Rptr. 27 at 28, the plaintiffs alleged malpractice and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
45. Foster & Freed, supra note 37, at 1071; Meriwether, supra note 6, at 147; Fra-
ser, supra note 32, at 663.
46. Meriwether, supra note 6, at 146-47.
47. Fraser, supra note 32, at 665; Meriwether, supra note 6, at 146-7; Sussman,
supra note 31, at 295-96; Besharov, supra note 36, at 480.
48. Fraser, supra note 32, at 665.
49. Sussman, supra note 31, at 295.
50. Comment, The California Legislative Approach to Problems of Willful Child
Abuse, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1805, 1821 (1966).
51. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (Deering 1980) stated the reporter would
"not be required to report as provided herein if in his opinion it would not be consistent
with the health, care or treatment of the minor."
52. Comment, supra note 50, at 1821.
1990]
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tion of emotional distress, 53 defamation, 54 false light invasion of
privacy, and negligence55 are other causes of action parents could
file.
In a claim based on malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must
prove the defendant instigated criminal proceedings against the
plaintiff maliciously."6 If the professional reported with a good
faith belief in the truth of the report, the plaintiff would be unable
to prove malice and would lose.5 Most states provide a qualified
immunity to individuals who report a suspected crime in good
faith. 8 That immunity would protect the reporter of child abuse
from any of these claims, as well as from claims of negligence and
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. In a defa-
mation case, in some states the plaintiff would again need to prove
malice.59 California, however, provides an absolute privilege for
communications in the course of a judicial proceeding, 60 and a
53. See Storch v. Silverman, 186 Cal. App. 3d 673, 674, 231 Cal. Rptr. 27, 28 (2d
Dist. 1986); Krikorian v. Barry, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1211, 1214, 242 Cal. Rptr. 312, 313 (2d
Dist. 1987); Montoya by Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285, 286 (Colo. App. 1988).
54. See Lehman v. Stephens, 148 III. App. 3d 538, 543, 499 N.E.2d 103, 107,
(1986).
55. See generally Sussman, supra note 31, at 245.
56. Daly, Willful Child Abuse and State Reporting Statutes, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV.
283, 328 (1969); Comment, supra note 50, at 1820. "Malicious" does not have a precise
definition in case law. Prosser says that malice in a malicious prosecution case is usually
"malice in fact," and may mean hatred, spite, or ill will. It may also be found when the
primary purpose in bringing the action is other than bringing an offender to justice. Pros-
ser, The Law of Torts, § 119 at 883 (West, 5th ed. 1984).
57. Sussman, supra note 31, at 294. "The fact is that in almost every conceivable
case ... a successful defense could be made by the mere showing of good faith or lack of
malice on the part of the reporter."
58. Id. "A legally recognized privilege pertains to those who report a crime or those
who report to the proper authorities any incident intended to protect innocent parties. In
such cases the reporter is normally protected even though he may be in error, assuming he
acted in good faith."
California provides no such privilege statutorily, although the common law may. Instead,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 148.5 provides that a person who reports a crime knowing the report
is false is guilty of a misdemeanor. 148.5(d) expressly exempts those making a report under
the California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Statute from liability under this section
(Deering Supp. 1989). Thus, one who is required to report child abuse and makes a report
knowing it to be false is protected from criminal liability for the false report under section
148.5 as well as under the Act.
59. Daly, supra note 56, at 328; Comment, supra note 50, at 1820-21. In defamation
cases, "malice" is defined by CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(4)(d) (Deering Supp, 1989): "'Actual
malice' is that state of mind arising from hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff; provided,
however, that such a state of mind occasioned by a good faith belief on the part of the
defendant in the truth of the libelous publication or broadcast at the time it is published or
broadcast shall not constitute actual malice."
In California, the plaintiff probably does not have to prove malice in a defamation case.
60. CAL. CIv. CODE 47(l),(2) (West Supp. 1988). ("A privileged publication or
broadcast is one made . . . 1. In the proper discharge of an official duty. 2. In any (i)
legislative or (2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by
law. .. .")
8
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qualified privilege for communications between "interested par-
ties." ' These privileges would protect the reporter from a defa-
mation suit.62
Some statutes provide protection from liability by including a
provision based on the state of mind or level of knowledge re-
quired to report. A state of mind provision functions indepen-
dently of an immunity provision. it is in effect whether or not an
immunity provision exists. The statute uses either a subjective or
an objective standard. The California statute uses an objective
standard and requires the reporter to have "reasonable suspicion"
that child abuse has occurred." If the reporter can show it was
reasonable to suspect child abuse, he or she cannot be held liable.
Therefore, liability should present no threat "to the honest
physician. 6 4
States providing a qualified immunity to mandated reporters
usually restrict that immunity to good faith actions.65 In an actior%
against a mandated reporter under this provision, the same result
is found as where there is no immunity provision; the plaintiff
must prove bad faith. The good faith requirement may have an
added punch in an action for negligence that the common law
does not provide. A reporter could be acting in good faith and still
be negligent,66 and therefore immune. The good faith requirement
would protect negligent reporters, but not malicious ones.
Absolute immunity provides the most protection. This type of
61. CAL. CIV. CODE 47(3) (West Supp. 1988). ("A privileged publication or broad-
cast is one made . . . 3. In a communication, without malice, to a person interested
therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such relation to the
person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the commu-
nication innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the
information.")
62. The reporting and investigation of child abuse would be "an official proceeding
authorized by law." See Loeblich v. City of Davis, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 1282, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 397, 404 (3d Dist. 1989) for an application of section 47(3) to a child abuse report-
ing case.
63. CAL PENAL CODE § 11166(a), (West Supp. 1988).
[A]ny child care custodian, health practitioner, or employee of a child protective
agency who has knowledge of or observes a child . . . who he or she knows or
reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse shall report the known or
suspected instance of child abuse to a child protective agency immediately. ...
For the purposes of this article, "reasonable suspicion" means that it is objectively
reasonable for a person to entertain such a suspicion, based upon facts that could
cause a reasonable person in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his or
her training and experience, to suspect child abuse.
Id.
64. Paulsen, supra note 41, at 34.
65. Id.; Meriwether, supra note 6, at 147.
66. This is especially true since child abuse can be difficult to diagnose; if a reporter
made a report based on little or no evidence, but honestly believed the report was true, he
or she would be protected even though negligent in making the report.
1990]
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provision precludes all claims, even when the defendant is mali-
ciously motivated. 7 The plaintiff can still file a suit, but it will be
halted at the demurrer or summary judgment stage.
The goal of immunity provisions is to encourage reports of sus-
pected child abuse. The threat or mere possibility of legal entan-
glement inhibits reporting.6 8 The main reason for immunity provi-
sions is to calm nervous fears.6 9 Still, they serve a very important
purpose. The simple fact that they can be publicized to potential
reporters makes them of value. 0
C. California's Immunity Provision, 1963 to Present
The California child abuse reporting statute was enacted in
1963 and listed various types of physicians who were required to
report.71 The statute gave these reporters immunity from "any
civil or criminal liability as a result of making any report author-
ized by this section. 17 2 The language of the provision does not re-
quire good faith by the reporter. It could be interpreted to provide
absolute immunity. (The first reported case interpreting the im-
munity provision was not decided until 1986, 7 after the statute
had been changed.) The periodical literature of the period sug-
gests some possible interpretations.
A literal interpretation would treat a report as "authorized"
only if the report is one required by the section.74 Under this in-
67. Paulsen, supra note 41, at 34.
68. Sussman, supra note 31, at 293.
69. "It is ironic that legal immunity, a factor so important in the discussions about
the need for child abuse reporting legislation, is probably unnecessary. No liability, in fact,
does exist for good faith reporting of the sort which the reporting laws now mandate or
permit." Paulsen, supra note 41, at 31. "This fear [of being sued] exists even though ap-
plying existing legal doctrines leads to the conclusion that anyone making a legally man-
dated or authorized report would be free from liability so long as the report was made in
good faith." Besharov, surpa note 26, at 475. "[Tlhere is no American case that even
suggests that there may be liability for a good-faith report of the kind required by battered
child statutes. In effect, the statutory immunity conferred by such statutes is a placebo for
medical 'nervous Nellies.'" Foster & Freed, supra note 37, at 1072. "[Tihe ultimate suc-
cess of a defense of privilege may well be assured. . ." McCoid, The Battered Child and
Other Assaults Upon the Family, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1, 39 (1965).
However, liability is not the only fear of reporters. "Legal entanglements" include time
in court, attorney's fees, publicity and anything else resulting from a lawsuit, even though
the reporter is not actually held liable. Even insurance cannot compensate the physician or
other reporter for time spent away from his or her business.
70. Paulsen, supra note 41, at 34.
71. As amended in 1966, the immunity provision was CAL. PENAL § CODE 11161.5
(Deering 1980).
72. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (Deering 1980).
73. The author's research reveals no appellate court cases interpreting any of the
amendments to the immunity provision until Storch v. Silverman, 186 Cal. App. 3d 679,
231 Cal. Rptr. 27 (Second Dist. 1986).
74. Comment, supra note 50, at 1818.
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terpretation, a report would not be authorized7 5 if the reporter did
not have the proper state of mind. 76 Therefore, a malicious or in-
tentionally false report would not be granted immunity because it
would not be authorized. 7 A report based on negligent diagnosis
would probably be authorized, if the reporter had reasonable
cause to believe the child was abused. 78
Another way to interpret the provision is to look at its pur-
pose.7 9 The purpose of the reporting statute and its immunity pro-
vision is helping abused children and encouraging reports.80 Using
this approach, a physician's report of child abuse, while the physi-
cian neither believed nor had reasonable cause for believing abuse
existed, would be making an unauthorized report.81 Without a
reasonable belief in the existence of abuse, the report would not
further the statute's purpose.82
In 1975, the immunity provision of the statute was amended.83
The amendment provided immunity "unless it can be proven that
a false report was made with malice. 8 4 In 1976, the provision was
again amended. "With malice" was replaced by the language
"and the person knew or should have known that the report was
false."85 The "knew or should have known" language denotes an
objective standard. The reporter is held to the standard of the rea-
sonably prudent person in a similar position. 8  Thus if a "reasona-
ble" physician would have known the report was false, our physi-
cian/reporter should also have known and can be held liable. In
contrast, a subjective standard would focus on what that physician
actually believed, not what he should have believed.8 7
The objective standard could have opened the door to claims by
parents that the physician should have known the report in their
75. Id.
76. The state of mind under the statute at this time was that "the minor has physical
injury or injuries which appear to have been inflicted on him by other than accidental
means . .. " Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (Deering 1980).
77. Comment, supra note 50, at 1818.
78. In many cases it is difficult for a physician to determine whether abuse has actu-
ally occurred. Krugman, "The Assessment Process of a Child Protection Team," THE BAT-
TERED CHILD, p. 132 (4th ed. 1987). In such a case, the physician should report reasonable
suspicions so that a child protection team can help in the diagnosis.
79. Comment, supra note 50, at 1818. This method of interpretation relies on the
policy reasons for the statute.
80. Sussman, supra note 27, at 310.
81. Comment, supra note 50, at 1818.
82. Id.
83. Former CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (Deering 1980).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Sussman, supra note 27, at 277.
87. Id.
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particular case was false."' The objective standard could inhibit
reporting. 89 If the physician or other reporter, under the pressure
of making an immediate decision on whether a child had been
abused, had been mistaken or negligent, the reporter could be held
liable for a false report. This might be so even if the reporter hon-
estly believed the child was abused.
With the objective standard, the physician/reporter is stuck be-
tween a rock and a hard place. If he reports what he suspects is
child abuse and he is wrong, he could be held liable. By not re-
porting child abuse, the physician could be held criminally and
civilly liable for failure to report.90 Even though the case law and
statutes already protect this physician,9' reading the statute does
not make the protection clear to a potential reporter. The reporter
would probably choose not to report at all, hoping to escape liabil-
ity for failure to report. Failure to report makes him less visible.92
In 1980, the immunity provision was repealed and the Child
Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act was enacted.9 3 The new Act
presented a new immunity provision.94 The new provision has the
same language granting immunity to professionals as the original
version enacted in 1963. An additional portion provides immunity
to voluntary reporters. 5
The use of identical language in the 1980 and 1963 versions is
significant. Either a literal or purpose-oriented approach could be
used in its interpretation, as discussed earlier in this section. It is
unclear how the legislature would have interpreted the original
version. They might have re-enacted it in its original form pur-
posefully. The available legislative history does not reveal whether
the legislature was even aware the language was the same.96
The differences in language between the grant of immunity to
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Besharov, supra note 36, at 480-81.
91. Sussman, supra note 27, at 294.
92. The first California case imposing liability for failure to report is Landeros v.
Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
93. Deering Supp. 1988.
94. "No child care custodian, health practitioner, employee of a child protective
agency, or commercial film and photographic print processor who reports a known or sus-
pected instance of child abuse shall be civilly or criminally liable for any report required or
authorized by this article." CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172(a) (Deering Supp. 1988).
95. "Any other person reporting a known or suspected instance of child abuse shall
not incur civil or criminal liability as a result of any report authorized by this article unless
it can be proven that a false report was made and the person knew that the report was false
or was made with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the report, and any such
person who makes [such a report] is liable for any damages caused." CAL. PENAL CODE
§11172(a) (Deering Supp. 1988).
96. For a review of the legislative history of section 11172(a), see Krikorian v. Barry,
196 Cal. App. 3d 1211, 242 Cal. Rptr. 312 (2d Dist. 1987).
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mandatory and to voluntary reporters is also significant. Volun-
tary reporters have immunity unless they intentionally file a false
report. 97 No such limitation on immunity is included in the grant
to mandatory reporters. 98 If the legislature intended to include a
limitation, they could have done so easily by saying "all persons"
have immunity, whether mandatory or voluntary reporters. The
language used in the two provisions strongly implies an absolute
immunity for mandated reporters.
Another change made to the statute in 1980 was to the stan-
dard for the level of knowledge required to report. The standard
was subjective under the old statute. The reporter must have actu-
ally believed the child was abused before the duty to report was
triggered. The legislature, in changing to an objective standard,
was attempting to overcome the California Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the former statute.99 The objective standard protects
the "honest" reporter, while the subjective standard protected only
dishonest'00 reporters. 10' If the abuse is reported, the reporter ob-
viously cannot be held liable for failure to report. If it is at all
reasonable for the reporter to suspect child abuse, he is not liable
for a false report even if the report actually is false. The objective
standard should encourage reporters who are not absolutely posi-
tive a child has been abused to report anyway, if it would be rea-
sonable to suspect abuse.
D. Interpretation of the Immunity Provision by California
Courts
In two recent cases, 102 issues involving the interpretation of the
immunity provision were before the California Second District
97. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172(a) (Deering Supp. 1988). See notes 89 and 90 for
text.
98. Id.
99. See Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. App. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1976), where the California Supreme Court held that the reporter must have a subjective
belief abuse existed before a report was required.
The objective standard for the level of knowledge required to report discussed here must
be distinguished from the objective standard of immunity under the old statute (former
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5, Deering 1980) discussed at pp. 17-18.
100. A "dishonest" reporter would be one who says he or she did not have a subjec-
tive belief the child was abused, in order to fit under the statute requiring him or her to
report only with a subjective belief of abuse. The reporter can avoid the requirement to
report merely by lying about having a subjective belief of child abuse.
101. Despite its flaws, the objective standard provides better protection for the child
than a subjective standard. Under the subjective standard, a reporter's poor judgment can
be shielded if he says that he really believed in his judgment. Sussman, supra note 27, at
278.
102. Storch v. Silverman, 186 Cal. App. 3d 673, 231 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1986); Krikorian
v. Barry, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1211, 242 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1987).
1990]
13
Dowding: Immunity Under the California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting A
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1989
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Appellate Court.103 The court interpreted the immunity provision
to provide absolute immunity to the mandated reporter. 04 A third
case, decided in the third district appellate court, disagreed with
the breadth of the second district's interpretation of immunity.0 5
Storch v. Silverman06 involved accusations against parents of a
10-year-old child. They alleged a negligent report of abuse. Their
cause of action was based on malpractice and negligent infliction
of emotional distress. They alleged that the physician/reporter
"knew or should have known [the careless and reckless diagnosis
of abuse] would and did cause severe emotional distress"'1 7 be-
cause plaintiffs were subjected to an investigation by police and a
protective service agency.'0 8 Defendant's demurrers were sus-
tained and the action was dismissed at the trial court.0 9
On appeal, plaintiffs promoted a literal interpretation of the
statute. They claimed negligent and knowingly false reports are
not "required or authorized by the law" since the reporter did not
"reasonably suspect" the abuse occurred."10 They claimed the re-
porter must have the requisite state of mind for the report to be
authorized."'
The court rejected plaintiffs' argument because it felt the literal
interpretation would render the immunity provision meaning-
less.' 12 The court claimed there is no need for immunity if there
can be no liability.1 3 In other words, if the only protected reports
are true reports, then the protection is unnecessary, because the
plaintiff would have no claim if the report were true. The court in
Storch seems to have missed the point of the immunity provision.
The purpose of immunity provisions is not strictly to provide im-
munity; that is probably provided by other statutes and common
law privileges." 4 Instead, the purpose is'to encourage reporting by
103. The Second District relied on Storch and Krikorian in another recent case, Mc-
Martin v. Children's Institute International, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1393, 261 Cal. Rptr. 437
(1989).
104. Storch, supra note 102.
105. Loeblich v. City of Davis, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 1282, 262 Cal. Rptr. 397,
404 (3d Dist. 1989).
106. Storch v. Silverman, 186 Cal. App. 3d 673, 231 Cal. Rptr. 27 (2d Dist. 1986).
107. Storch at 676; 231 Cal. Rptr. 27 at 28.
108. Id. An investigation is standard procedure under the California Child Abuse
and Neglect Reporting Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11164-11174 (Deering Supp. 1988).
109. Id. at 675, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 29. The trial court held that Penal Code section
11172(a) provides absolute immunity from civil liability for all medical practitioners in-
volved in the reporting of suspected abuse.
110. Id. at 678, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
I11. Id. This issue is discussed in section C of this Comment and in Comment, supra
note 50, at 1818.
112. Id. at 678, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
113. Id.
114. See generally section C above.
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publicizing the fact that reporters are protected"15 and to discour-
age unfounded litigation. The immunity provision is largely cos-
metic;116 the reporter would not be held liable for a report made
in good faith. 117 The court in Storch failed to recognize the essen-
tial purpose of the provision. It is precisely because reporters were
unlikely to be aware of other statutory and common law protec-
tions that immunity provisions were originally included in report-
ing statutes."'
In Krikorian v. Barry,119 a child care facility alleged that those
individuals reporting abuse by employees of the facility were im-
mune from liability only for the act of reporting the abuse, but not
for the investigation leading up to the report. 20 The court held
the Act provides absolute immunity not only for reporting but also
"for conduct giving rise to the obligation to report, such as the
collection of data, or the observation, examination, or treatment of
the suspected victim or perpetrator of child abuse, performed in a
professional capacity or within the scope of employment ... .
Thus, if the injury the plaintiff claimed flowed from the act of
reporting or for any activities required in relation to making the
report, the reporter would be immune under Krikorian from suit
on that injury.122 The court was following its own ruling in Storch
on this issue. The Storch court stated, in dicta, that even if a re-
porter maliciously and knowingly submitted a false report of child
abuse with the intent to vex, annoy and harass an innocent party,
that reporter would still have absolute immunity from civil or
criminal liability.' 23
The Third District Appellate Court, in Loeblich v. City of Da-
vis,'24 disagreed with the second district court's broad interpreta-
tion of the immunity statute. The plaintiffs in Loeblich were a
mother, her two daughters, and her husband. The defendants in-
cluded a school nurse, social workers, a teacher, the school, the
115. Sussman, supra note 27, at 310.
116. Fraser, supra note 32, at 664.
117. This issue is discussed in section C above and in Comment, supra note 50, at
1818. The reporter will have to claim the privilege as a defense in the course of the suit
against him.
118. "These probably unnecessary immunity provisions may encourage reporting
simply because they exist and can be publicized to physicians." Paulsen, supra note 41, at
34.
119. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1211, 242 Cal. Rptr. 312 (2d Dist. 1987).
120. Id. at 1222, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
121. Id. at 1223, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
122. The court in Krikorian discussed more issues than this section implies; discus-
sion of the remaining issues by the court culminated in following the holding in Storch, and
so does not bear repeating in this Comment.
123. Storch, at 681, 231 Cal Rptr. at 33.
124. 213 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 262 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1989).
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City of Davis, and a Davis police officer.
A school bus driver, on hearing a remark of a sexual nature by
four-year-old Anastassia Loeblich, reported the event to school
authorities, who subsequently reported the matter to the County
Department of Social Services (DSS) and the Police Depart-
ment. 2 5 A DSS worker telephoned Anastassia's mother, Karen
Loeblich, and informed her that her husband had confessed to
abusing Anastassia, and that the child "had a bloody vagina,
[and] distended anus with no bowel control" as a result of "re-
peated and continued sexual abuse .... ,"126 Anastassia was held
in DSS custody for eleven hours, even after University of Califor-
nia Medical Center personnel examined her and she was found
"not to have any clinical signs of molestation."'" 7 Upon Karen
Loeblich's arrival, her daughter Alekxandra was seized by the so-
cial workers and held for over two hours.
Six months later, the Loeblich family filed suit, alleging false
imprisonment, libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 128 The court sustained the defendants' demurrers
on the basis of "the absolute immunity conferred upon defendants
under [the Act]."12
On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the conduct of the defend-
ants went beyond that protected by the Act. The court declined to
follow the holding in Krikorian that provided immunity for "con-
duct giving rise to the obligation to report . . . performed in a
professional capacity or within the scope of employment."'' 30 In
construing the phrase, "for any report required or authorized by
this article. . . ",s' the court found that, "by its plain and unam-
biguous terms, the immunity conferred by the Act is limited to
injury caused by the act of reporting suspected child abuse." 3 '
125. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, Loeblich v. City of Davis, 213 Cal. App. 3d
1272, 262 Cal. Rptr. 397 (No. 56423).
126. Id. at 1277, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 399. All of these allegations were found to be
untrue, and the investigation of the family ended about a week later.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Krikorian at 1223, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 319. The Loeblich court pointed out that
the defendant preschool owner in Krikorian, who cross-complained against the psychologist
hired by the parents to investigate the alleged abuse, did not have standing to assert profes-
sional negligence on behalf of the children. The only damage to the defendant was the loss
of the defendant's child care license, which was a direct result of a report from the psychol-
ogist. Therefore, the court in Krikorian only needed to find immunity for the report in
order to sustain the demurrers. Any holding of the court beyond that was dicta. Loeblich at
1280, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11772(a) (Deering Supp. 1988).
132. Loeblich at 1281, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 402. It is interesting to note that, under the
holding of Loeblich, the defendant physician in Phinney (supra notes 25 & 26) could be
held liable for medical malpractice, since his alleged act of fatally injuring the child was
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The court then considered provisions in the statute expressly relat-
ing to specific types of activity associated with reporting,' 33 and
determined that these provisions would be rendered superfluous by
a broad interpretation of the Act.' The court proceeded to hold
the city and county defendants immune from liability for libel and
slander3 5 under a statute granting absolute immunity to public
officials for communications made in the course of an official pro-
ceeding.136 The court remanded the matter to the trial court for
determination of the liability of the defendants for false imprison-
ment and intentional infliction of emotional distress.13 7
The Loeblich court's holding does not disagree that mandated
reporters should be immune from liability for the making of the
report. The court looked to other statutory provisions and found
that, under certain circumstances, those provisions gave reporters
protection for activities outside the actual report. It was therefore
unnecessary to extend the Act's reach, as attempted by Storch
and Krikorian.
Storch and Krikorian held that California's statute granted ab-
solute immunity for activities relating to child abuse reports;
Loeblich limited the absolute immunity to the reports themselves,
not the investigative activities leading to them. This limitation will
probably aid only a small number of plaintiffs. Regardless of
which specific holding is ultimately followed, absolute immunity is
still the regime under which child abuse reporting cases will be
not the result of a report, but was a negligent act performed during activities leading up to
the report.
133. Specifically, the court was referring to the provision in Cal Penal Code section
11172(a) providing that "[n]o person required to make a report pursuant to this article,
nor any person taking photographs at his or her direction, shall incur any civil or criminal
liability for taking photographs of a suspected victim of child abuse, or causing photo-
graphs to be taken of a suspected victim of child abuse, without parental consent, or for
disseminating the photographs with the reports required by this article." Also, section
11172(b), immunizing any mandated reporter who, "pursuant to a request from a child
protective agency, provides the requesting agency with access to the victim of a known or
suspected instance of child abuse ....
134. Loeblich at 1281-82, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 402. The court stated, "despite strong
policy arguments for extending immunity to investigative activity generally, it is clear that
beyond the act of reporting, the Legislature chose to protect only the related incidental
conduct specifically described in the statute." Id.
135. Id. at 1285, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(2) (West Supp. 1988). The court rejected the City and
County defendants' contention that they were also immune under Government Code sec-
tion 820.2, which provides: "[A] public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from
his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion
vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused." The court held that, even though
the decision to investigate the alleged child abuse was discretionary, the tortious conduct
performed after having made the discretionary decision to act was ministerial, and there-
fore not immune. (McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d 252, 269, 449 P.2d 453, 74
Cal. Rptr. 389 (1969)).
137. Id. at 1286, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
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decided. Absolute immunity does not preclude the filing of law-
suits against reporters; it simply provides that the plaintiff will
lose as a matter of law. Reporters still have problems, such as
potential loss of money and time, under the regime of absolute
immunity.
First, lawsuits will still be filed, possibly by plaintiffs with legiti-
mate claims of malicious reporting. Other suits may be filed by
plaintiffs without legitimate claims, who hope the reporter will
settle out of court for a large sum rather than face a court bat-
tie. 38 Although the court can order a losing plaintiff to pay attor-
ney's fees, the plaintiff may be penniless. With this in mind, the
legislature in 1984 amended the statute to provide for state pay-
ment of attorney's fees for reporters who prevail in the
litigation.1 39
This provision does not end the concerns of the professional re-
porter. Loss of money spent on attorney's fees is not the worst part
of litigation for some professionals. Lawsuits, even when halted in
preliminary stages, take time. The medical practitioner is not at-
tending to patients, and the child care custodian must leave the
business in other hands to go to court. This is especially a problem
for the small licensed day care center, with a small or single-mem-
ber staff. The family physician or dentist in sole practice faces the
same problem. The notoriety of a lawsuit could cost the profes-
sional future business, even if absolved of all claims.1 40 Absolute
immunity will not deter these results.
On the other side of the coin, the reporter who files a malicious
or knowingly false report is completely protected from civil liabil-
ity under the Storch doctrine, even though he may have commit-
ted malpractice or criminal child abuse himself.' 4' The accused
can sue, but will lose at the early stages of litigation because the
reporter is immune.
138. McCoid, supra note 41, at 39.
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172(e) (Deering Supp. 1988).
140. For example, if one hears about the charges on television, one may not be
watching when the outcome of the trial is announced. Note also the result of the McMartin
preschool case, the longest criminal trial in U.S. history, in which the defendants, owners
and operators of a child care facility, were found not guilty of most charges, and a mistrial
was called on the remaining charges because the jury could not agree. One defendant spent
five years in jail, only to be found not guilty at trial.
141. The Loeblich holding could find its real value in this type of situation. Surely
this result is the real intent of the legislature: the protection of those reporters acting in
good faith, but not those who have committed a crime or an intentional tort.
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E. Possible Solutions
One avenue the accused but innocent parent might pursue is to
report the reporter. If the reporter is a physician, California has a
Board of Medical Quality Assurance to investigate complaints of
unprofessional conduct. 142 It is unknown at this time whether
knowingly false or malicious reports of child abuse are unprofes-
sional conduct. 143 When acts of unprofessional conduct are found
by the Board, disciplinary action is taken. The physician may be
publicly reprimanded, lose his license, or be placed on suspension
or probation. 4 4 In this situation, the physician is punished. How-
ever, any injury caused by the false report is not compensated.
Although the falsely accused parent may get some satisfaction
from this disciplinary action, the remedy of money damages is not
available.
Another solution for the falsely accused parent is for the legisla-
ture to change or the courts to re-interpret the immunity provision
to give only qualified immunity to reporters, as did the court in
Loeblich. This change would still allow a parent to sue the re-
porter. The reporter would probably still win because of the other
statutory and common law protections available to the reporter. 45
In certain cases, such as in a defamation suit, common law protec-
tions would not cover a knowingly false or malicious report, unless
it was made in the course of an official proceeding. In that case,
the plaintiff could win, but only by proving the report was mali-
cious or knowingly false. The reporter would still have the same
problems as under absolute immunity, including loss of- time and
business by involvement in the litigation. In addition, the Ameri-
can Medical Association would presumably publicize such a statu-
tory change in the law to keep its members informed. Professional
reporters might feel the loss of the privilege would expose them to
liability. They would again fear to report. The purpose of encour-
aging reports would not be served by this type of change. As one
142. Unprofessional conduct is defined in section 2234 of the Business and Profes-
sions Code as including but not limited to the following: a) violating any provision of the
Medical Practice Act; b) gross negligence; c) repeated negligent acts; d) incompetence; e)
commission of any act involving dishonesty or corruption which is substantially related to
the qualifications, functions, or duties of a physician and surgeon. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
section 2234 (Deering 1986). In addition, section 2261 provides that "knowingly making or
signing any certificate or other document directly or indirectly related to the practice of
medicine or podiatry which falsely represents the existence or nonexistence of a state of
facts, constitutes unprofessional conduct."
143. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE cites no cases concerning this issue.
144. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2227 (Deering 1986). Other chapters of the code
refer specifically to dentists (sections 1600-1800), nurses (sections 2700-2896), psycholo-
gists (sections 2900-2995), and other healing arts (sections 500-1320).
145. See generally section C above.
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authority states:
A statutory rejection of liability [is not] a complete solution to
the problem of physicians' reluctance through fear of liability.
Clearly no statute will prevent the filing of a groundless claim or
avoid some form of litigation vindicating the physician.146
The same could probably be said regarding reinterpretation by the
courts.
F. Proposal
Changing the immunity provided to reporters will not solve the
litigation problems. A solution that goes outside the realm of liti-
gation would be more useful. A panel or board of review could
look at claims against reporters before they reach the litigation
stage. This panel would determine if the claims have merit which
would speak for instigation of a court trial.
The panel would be a peer review board similar to the Board of
Medical Quality Assurance. This panel, unlike the Board, would
include members of different professions. For example, in a case
against a child care facility, a member of the child care field
would be part of the panel; a chiropractor would be on the panel if
the case involved a chiropractor. In this way, someone from the
reporter's peer group would be able to render an expert opinion on
the reasonableness of the report under the circumstances.147
The panel would also include members of the legal profession.
Their responsibility would be to interpret the evidence and the law
for the benefit of the panel.
This panel would review claims against reporters. If the evi-
dence provided by the plaintiffs were sufficient to prove intention-
ally false or malicious reporting, the claim would then be brought
to court and tried before a jury.148 If the evidence were insuffi-
cient, the claim would be dismissed.
The main advantage to the peer review panel is that it takes
146. McCoid, supra note 41, at 39. McCoid also questions the extent to which im-
munity really encourages reporting. For McCoid's discussion of this issue see McCoid,
supra note 41, at 39 n95.
147. In any peer review situation there is the possibility that peers will not act im-
partially. However, many professions use peer review, as those not trained in that field are
unlikely to understand the particular problems of the professional.
148. A reasonable standard of proof to use in such cases could be "by a preponder-
ance of the evidence." Thus, the Board would decide if the evidence showed it was more
likely than not that the report was made maliciously or with knowledge of its falsity. At
trial, a higher standard of proof (such as "clear and convincing evidence") could be used.
If the same standard of proof were used by the Board as in trial, a jury could assume that
since the Board had sent the case to trial, there was definitely enough evidence to find
liability. The jury might decide to rely more on the Board's decision than on the evidence
presented.
[Vol. 26
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cases out of the court system, yet allows legitimate claims to be
heard. The reporter would have representatives on the panel who
would understand his needs and duties as a reporting professional.
The time and money spent to defend litigation would be reduced.
Potentially damaging publicity would be less of a factor. Suits
brought only to induce a settlement in avoidance of trial would
also be reduced. Only legitimate claims would be allowed to go to
trial. In addition, the falsely accused parents would have an op-
portunity to present their legitimate claims, a right they do not
have under the regime of absolute immunity.
The main disadvantage of this system would be the cost. It
might be difficult to get professionals willing to take time off from
their regular schedules to serve on the panel. 4 ' However, the solu-
tion should not be rejected simply because it may cost money.
Perhaps the funds the legislature intended to spend on payment of
reporters' attorneys' fees under the current system 50 could be
used to fund the new system. Municipal funds might also be used,
especially in locations where there is an inordinately high rate of
child abuse.
Another possibility is to extend the duties of the Board of Medi-
cal Quality Assurance and similar Boards for other professions.
These Boards could send cases to trial, in addition to determining
the disciplinary actions to be taken. This extension would merely
provide a private right of action to a complainant. These Boards
already perform similar work, and their extension is the most logi-
cal and least costly solution. In any case, this proposal should be
given consideration as an attempt to provide an equitable solution
to both sides of this controversy.
CONCLUSION
Since the beginning of mandatory child abuse reporting laws in
the late 1950s and 1960s, the need to provide some incentive and
protection to reporters was recognized. In California, it seemed
that immunity provisions were working. There were no reported
cases on the subject until 1986. This Comment has attempted to
show that immunity provisions are not working. Children are still
being abused; reporters are still deterred from reporting because
they are worried about being sued; falsely accused individuals
may still have no remedy under the law.' 5' A solution to this prob-
149. There is no way of knowing how many cases could come before the Board.
Because the law currently provides absolute immunity for reporters, prospective plaintiffs
are halted at the attorney's door, and their suits are never filed.
150. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172(e) Supp. 1988).
151. Presuming that courts continue to hold reporters absolutely immune.
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lem is urgently needed, not because it will stop child abuse, but
because it could bring more cases of abuse to light. Only when a
reporter makes known a case of abuse can the child and the
abuser get help. Only when the reporter feels safe from unfounded
litigation will he report.
L. Lee Dowding
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